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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Punitive Damages Author-
ized In Section 1983 Action When "Reckless Disregard"
Shown. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
Section 19831 is a powerful legislative "sword ' 2 enacted
by Congress for the protection of constitutional rights
against infringement by the states. In Smith v. Wade4 the
United States Supreme Court decided what constitutes a
"proper case" for an award of punitive damages under this
statute. The Court, in a five to four decision,5 explicitly au-
thorized punitive damages under section 1983 and estab-
lished a "reckless disregard" standard as the requisite mental
state for their imposition.6
This note begins with a synopsis of the underlying facts
in Smith. Next, the development of punitive damages under
section 1983 is discussed, followed by an analysis of the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. Finally, this note considers
the impact of the decision by examining the role that puni-
tive damages will play in future constitutional tort litigation.
I. THE FACTS IN SMITH V. WADE
Daniel Wade was an inmate at Algoa Reformatory, a
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). The statute provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
2. The metaphor is used in the sense that the remedies available under section
1983 include not only compensatory damages and injunctive relief, but also punitive
damages-the focus of this note.
3. The purpose of section 1983 was "to stamp out widespread violations of consti-
tutional rights at virtually any cost. .. ." Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 234
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
5. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined. Justice O'Connor filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
6. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1640.
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unit for youthful first offenders.7 Although Wade had vol-
untarily checked into the protective custody unit, he was re-
moved to administrative segregation for disciplinary
violations. During his first day in administrative segrega-
tion, Wade was placed in a cell with another inmate from
the general prison population. When guard William Smith
came on duty, he placed a third inmate in Wade's cell. Ac-
cording to Wade, his cellmates beat and sexually assaulted
him.8
Wade brought a section 1983 action against Smith and
four other guards and correctional officers, alleging that his
eighth amendment9 right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment had been violated.'0 Wade sought both com-
pensatory and punitive damages.
At trial, Wade established that the third inmate added to
his cell had been placed in the administrative unit for fight-
ing. Smith had made no effort to discover whether another
cell was available, although there was at least one cell con-
taining only one occupant. Furthermore, another inmate
had been beaten to death a few weeks earlier in the same
dormitory during Smith's shift. Based on these facts, Wade
claimed that Smith knew or should have known that an as-
sault against him was likely to occur."
The district court judge instructed the jury that it may
award punitive damages upon a finding that the conduct
shows "a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to,
the rights or safety of others."'" The jury found only Smith
liable and awarded Wade $25,000 in compensatory damages
and $5,000 in punitive damages.' 3
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained
7. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1983).
8. Id. At the time of the assault Daniel Wade was 18 years old, five feet, eight
inches tall and weighed approximately 130 pounds. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778,
780 (8th Cir. 1981), afTd sub nom. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
10. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1627.
11. Id. This would defeat Smith's qualified immunity defense. See infra note 66.




the award of punitive damages.1 4  The Supreme Court
granted certiorari15 and affirmed both the award of such




A. Development of Punitive Damages under Section 1983
Section 198317 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law.'8 Although en-
acted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,19 the statute
remained relatively dormant until the United States
Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Pape20 ninety years
later.21 Recent Supreme Court decisions have established
that local governments are subject to suit as persons within
section 1983,22 and have sanctioned section 1983 damages
for violations of federal law as well as constitutional
violations.23
Section 1983 does not prescribe the appropriate legal
remedy, but merely states that a defendant "shall be liable to
14. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. Smith v.
Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
15. Smith v. Wade, 456 U.S. 924 (1982).
16. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1640.
17. Section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. V
1981), began as section I of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, Pub. L. No. _
16 Stat. 433 (1871), which was enacted by Congress pursuant to section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment in order to enforce that amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 171 (1961).
18. See generaly S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION
(1979 & Supp. 1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
19. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980)).
20. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled in part by Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
21. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1334-36 (1952); Note, supra note 18, at 1137-75.
22. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See
also S. NAHMOD, supra note 18, at §§ 6.01-.09; Carlisle, Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence: Toward Constructing a Model of Municipal Liability after Monell, 12 URB.
LAW. 292 (1980); Schappner, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
213 (1979). Governmental units are absolutely immune, however, from liability for
punitive damages under section 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 43-49.
23. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See also Note, Section 1983: Carte
Blanche Remedy for Federal Statutory Violations?, 10 STETSON L. REV. 507 (1980).
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the party injured in an action at law."24 In Monroe the
Court intimated that all forms of monetary relief available at
common law were available in section 1983 actions.2 5 Sev-
enteen years later, in Carey v. P#7hus,26 the Court expressly
held that the common law of torts was the appropriate start-
ing point for determining section 1983 damages.27
Reasoning that the dispute sounded in tort, the availabil-
ity of punitive damages under section 1983 was first pro-
claimed in dictum by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in 1939.28 In the leading case, Basista v. Weir, 29 the
Third Circuit justified an award of punitive damages on the
theory that it would serve the congressional purpose of "vin-
dicating civil rights in civil suits. '30 The court further held
that punitive damages may be awarded even in the absence
of actual damages.'
While the Supreme Court had not gone as far explicitly
as the Third Circuit in Basista, it nevertheless strongly sug-
gested in three recent decisions 32 that punitive damages were
appropriate in constitutional tort actions. In Carey v.
Pfphus 33 the Supreme Court adopted the view that, at least
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
25. Justice Douglas stated that section 1983 "[s]hould be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
26. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
27. Id. at 257-58. Earlier in the opinion the Supreme Court stated: "[Section
1983] was intended to '[create] a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are
deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution."
Id. at 253 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
28. See Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modofed, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
29. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
30. Id. at 86. As noted by one commentator, the court in Basista justified puni-
tive damages in a brief discussion in which it "neglected to explain precisely how
punitive damages would vindicate civil rights ...... Comment, Punitive Damages
Under Federal Statutes: A FunctionalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 191, 202 (1972).
31. Basista, 340 F.2d at 87. The general rule under federal common law is that
nominal damages will support a punitive damage award. See, e.g., Brady v. Smith,
656 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1981); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976); Spence
v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees, 474
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. The decisions are: City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
See also Note, Punitive Damages in Constitutional Tort Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 530 (1982).
33. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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in the context of procedural due process, an award of com-
pensatory damages must be fashioned to redress actual harm
suffered and cannot be justified solely on the basis of deter-
ring future constitutional rights violations. The Court stated
that "[t]o the extent that Congress intended that awards
under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional
rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deter-
rent more formidable than that inherent in the award of
compensatory damages. 34
While this language seems to foreclose the recovery of
punitive damages, the Court also indicated that punitive
damages might be awarded in a "proper case" under section
1983 with the specific purpose of deterring and punishing
violations of constitutional rights.35 The Court recognized
that six of the circuits allowed punitive damages in section
1983 actions, 36 but it expressly refused to approve or disap-
prove them. The only explicit guidance the Court offered on
the issue of punitive damages was that no basis existed for
such damages in Carey because "[t]he District Court specifi-
cally found that petitioners did not act with a malicious in-
tention to deprive respondents of their right or to do them
other injury. '37
In Carlson v. Green31 the Court considered whether a
remedy was available directly under the Constitution in a
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 39 action when the
plaintiff's allegations could also support a claim under the
34. Id. at 256-57.
35. Id. at 257 n.11.
36. Id. The decisions of the six circuits are: Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163-
64 (10th Cir. 1976); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1974);
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968);
Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74,
84-88 (3d Cir. 1965). See also infra notes 53 and 57 for other courts allowing punitive
damages in section 1983 actions.
37. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n. 11. This factual finding was made by the district
court in the context of holding that the defendants had not abused their qualified
immunity by acting in subjective bad faith. Id. at 251 n.6.
38. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
39. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens the Supreme Court established an implied
cause of action directly under the Constitution against federal officials. The Bl'ens
remedy is essentially a judicially created equivalent of section 1983, except that it
applies to persons violating constitutional rights under color of federal law.
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Federal Tort Claims Act.4 ° Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan examined several factors, including the availability
of punitive damages in a Bivens action, before he concluded
that the Bivens remedy was superior.41 Concerning punitive
damages, the Court stated:
[O]ur decisions, although not expressly addressing and de-
ciding the question, indicate that punitive damages may be
awarded in a Bivens suit. Punitive damages are "a particu-
lar remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts," . . . and are especially appropriate to redress the
violation by a Government official of a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. Moreover, punitive damages are available in
"a proper" § 1983 action ....
In the third and most recent case, City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 4 3 the Court ruled that a municipality may not
be held liable for punitive damages under section 1983 be-
cause municipal corporations were immune from such dam-
ages at common law.44 The Court's opinion, written by
Justice Blackmun, analyzed the role of punitive damages in
constitutional tort actions. The Court stated that the pur-
pose of punitive damages was retribution and deterrence,
not compensation.45 Regarding retribution, Justice Black-
mun noted that the Court "never has suggested that punish-
ment is as prominent a purpose under the statute as are
compensation and deterrence. 46 The Court concluded that
40. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (the principal
provisions of the Act are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976)).
41. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
42. Id. at 21-22. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that despite assertions to
the contrary, the Court had never decided whether punitive damages were available
in Bivens actions or in section 1983 actions. Id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
44. Id. at 271. The Supreme Court has preserved many of the traditional immu-
nities under section 1983, including four absolute immunities: Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators). There
are also several qualified immunities: Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)
(prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental hospital ad-
ministrators); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (government officers); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers).
45. Newport, 453 U.S. at 266-67.
46. Id. at 268.
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awarding punitive damages here would only "punish" inno-
cent taxpayers and that "neither reason nor justice" dictated
such a result.47
Turning to the major objective of punitive damages, the
Court maintained "that the deterrence of future abuses of
power by persons acting under color of state law is an im-
portant purpose of section 1983.''48 After questioning
whether assessing punitive damages against the municipality
would deter officials from wrongdoing, the Court found a
more effective means of deterrence: "By allowing juries and
courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circum-
stances against the offending official, based on his personal
financial resources, the statute directly advances the public's
interest in preventing repeated constitutional depriva-
tions. ' 49 This, the Court concluded, would provide sufficient
protection against the prospect that a public official may
commit recurrent constitutional violations by reason of his
office.
Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that punitive
damages are appropriate in certain constitutional tort ac-
tions. The Court has provided less guidance, however, on
the related issue of the state of mind necessary for a recovery
of such damages.
B. The Requisite Mental State
Concerning the mental state required for an award of pu-
nitive damages under section 1983, the Supreme Court, in
dicta, has offered two different standards. This inconsistency
is reflected in the conflicting standards adopted by the lower
federal courts.5
In Adickes v. Kress & Co. 51 Justice Brennan stated in a
concurring opinion that punitive damages were appropriate
in a section 1983 action whenever the defendant acted "with
actual knowledge that he was violating a [constitutional]
47. Id. at 267.
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id. at 269.
50. For citations of lower federal court cases which have adopted different stan-
dards, see infra notes 53 & 57. See also Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973) (punitive
damages in actions for violations of federal civil rights acts).
51. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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right" or with "reckless disregard of whether he was thus
violating such a right."5 2 Several lower federal courts have
adopted this actual knowledge or reckless disregard standard
as the state of mind requirement for the recovery of punitive
damages in section 1983 actions.53 Several commentators
have also approved of this standard.5 4
In Carey v. Piohus,55 on the other hand, Justice Powell
noted that there was no basis for a punitive damages award
because the defendant had not acted with "malicious intent"
to deprive plaintiffs of their rights.56 Several lower courts
have adopted a malice standard requiring a higher degree of
culpability than the knowledge or reckless disregard
standard.5 7
III. THE SMITH Opinions
A. The Majority
Writing for the majority in Smith v. Wade,58 Justice
Brennan first stated that the Court's earlier decisions made it
clear that punitive damages are available under section
1983. 59 Turning to the issue at hand, the Court rejected a
52. Id. at 233.
53. See, e.g., Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) ("acted with
actual knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless
disregard of whether he was doing so"); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 243 (8th
Cir. 1978) ("willfully and in gross disregard for the [plaintiffs] rights"); Gore v. Tur-
ner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977) ("willfully and with gross disregard for the
plaintiff's rights"); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976) ("reckless
indifference to the property rights of others, ill will, a desire to injure or malice").
54. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 1242, 1279-81 (1979); McClellan & Northcross, Remedies and Dam-
ages for Violations of Constitutional Rights, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 407, 466-71 (1980).
55. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), the
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "malicious intent" in the context of a quali-
fied immunity claim. The Court there stated: "This part of the rule speaks of 'inten-
tional injury,' contemplating that the actor intends the consequences of his conduct."
Id. at 566.
56. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n. 11(1978). See supra text accompanying note 37.
57. See. e.g., Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1978) ("malicious and
wanton disregard"); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) ("willful
and malicious"); Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1973) ("willful and mali-
cious"); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("mal-
ice"); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968) ("outrageous invasion of plaintiff's privacy").
58. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
59. Id. at 1629.
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malicious intent standard as the degree of culpability which
would permit an award of punitive damages, and instead
held that a reckless disregard standard was the proper rule.60
Noting that there was little in the legislative history of
section 1983 on damages, the Court looked to the rule at
common law as it existed in 1871.61 After an exhaustive re-
view of the federal and state decisions in the late nineteenth
century, the Court concluded that the majority rule permit-
ted punitive damages awards on various standards of reck-
lessness or other culpable conduct short of actual malicious
intent.62 This same rule, the Court noted, is applied today.63
The Court then determined that the policies and pur-
poses of section 1983 did not require a departure from the
rules of tort common law. The Court stated: "We discern
no reason why a person whose federally guaranteed rights
have been violated should be granted a more restrictive rem-
edy than a person asserting an ordinary tort cause of
action." 64
The Court rejected the argument that a reckless disre-
gard standard was too vague to provide clear guidance and
reasonable deterrence. 5 Nor did the Court feel that a higher
standard was required in this case even though the same
60. Id. at 1640.
61. Id. at 1628. In interpreting section 1983, the Court has often looked to the
common law as it existed in 1871, in the belief that, when Congress was silent on a
point, it intended to adopt the principles of the common law. Id. at 1659 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258
(1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
62. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1631-35. See also Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith,
129 U.S. 26, 34 (1889) ("culpable negligence"); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115
U.S. 512, 521 (1885) ("gross negligence"); Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S.
489, 493 (1876) ("willfully" or "reckless indifference" which is "equivalent to an in-
tentional violation"); Philadelphia, W. & B. Ry. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 214 (1859)
("wantonly" or "maliciously" implying a "spirit of mischief' or "criminal
indifference").
63. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1635. The Court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(2) (1979), which provides in part: "Punitive damages may be awarded
for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500 comment a (1965) (discussing what constitutes "reckless" conduct).
64. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1636.
65. Id. at 1636-37. The Court noted that in the important area of first amend-
ment freedoms, a similar standard was adopted for imposing punitive damages in
defamation actions. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)
("knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth").
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reckless indifference standard had been applied to determine
Smith's liability in the first instance due to his qualified im-
munity.6 6 The Court maintained that while the same thresh-
old of liability was applied for both compensatory and
punitive damages, this did not mean that both forms of dam-
ages were equally available. The Court explained that while
compensatory damages are mandatory, an award of punitive
damages is within the discretion of the jury which must
make a moral judgment that the defendant's conduct war-
ranted punishment and deterrence. Moreover, the Court
noted that there has never been a general common law rule
that the threshold for punitive damages must always be
higher than that for compensatory liability.67
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Rehnquist dissented, vigorously attacking both
the reasoning and the result of the majority opinion.68 He
viewed the majority's decision as "blindly" adopting a rem-
edy which has been "vigorously criticized throughout the
Nation's history."69 Although he suggested several times
that punitive damages should not be allowed under section
1983, Justice Rehnquist stated that the proper standard for
an award of such damages under section 1983 required some
degree of bad faith or improper motive on the part of the
66. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1638. The Supreme Court has extended a qualified im-
munity to various public officials including prison guards. See supra note 44. The
requirements for a qualified immunity are: (1) that the official has a reasonable belief
in the legality of his actions under the circumstances, and (2) that he must have acted
in good faith. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978). Thus, the qualified
immunity defense would be unavailable to a government official who knew that he
was violating the Constitution (subjective bad faith) or should have known that he
was violating the Constitution (objective bad faith). Id.
Furthermore, in eighth amendment cases, unless the prison official's behavior con-
stitutes "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's plight, thereby constituting the "un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the eighth amendment, the
officer cannot be liable under section 1983, since no right has been violated. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
67. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1638. The Second Restatement of Torts states that "in
torts like malicious prosecution that require a particular antisocial state of mind, the
improper motive of the tortfeasor is both a necessary element in the cause of action
and a reason for awarding punitive damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908 comment c (1977).
68. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1640-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1656.
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defendant.70 He claimed that this standard was the majority
rule in 1871, and that the Court had misinterpreted those
nineteenth century cases.7'
Justice Rehnquist further criticized the Court for inade-
quately assessing the public policies implicated in its deci-
sion. In his judgment, the dangers that accompany the
vague recklessness standard adopted by the Court far out-
weighed the deterrence achieved. 72  He perceived the dan-
gers to include encouraging unnecessary litigation, which
would further add to the federal backlog,73 and impeding de-
cisive action by public officials who may be intimidated by
the threat of punitive damages.74
Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissent, disagreed with
the approaches taken by the Court and Justice Rehnquist.75
She maintained that once it is established that the common
law of 1871 provides no "real guidance," 76 the issue should
be resolved by determining which rule best accommodates
the policies underlying section 1983. Since compensatory
damages coupled with attorney's fees77 already provide sig-
70. Id. at 1640.
71. Id. at 1646. Justice Rehnquist read the cases cited insupra note 62 as "unam-
biguously" supporting an actual malice standard. Id. See also Scott v. Donald, 165
U.S. 58, 86 (1897) ("evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression");
Lake Shore & Michigan So. R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893) ("wanton, mali-
cious or oppressive intent"); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) ("wanton
and malicious or gross and outrageous").
72. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1657 n.16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1657-58. One can hardly read about section 1983 without seeing a ref-
erence to the overwhelming number of section 1983 cases. Between the enactment of
the statute in 1871 and 1939, there were only 19 section 1983 cases reported. In 1960,
the year prior to Monroe, only 280 cases were filed. By 1970, the number had risen to
3,586, and the upward trend continued in 1971 with an increase to 4,609. The most
recent data indicate that there are approximately 13,000 new filings annually. See
Comment, The Supreme Court Corrals a Runaway Section 1983, 34 MERCER L. REv.
1073, 1075 n.24 (1983). But see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and
an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 533 (1982) (asserting that dividing
these recent figures by two, or even three, would yield a more accurate estimate of the
number of section 1983 cases).
74. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1656 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see infra text accom-
panying notes 92-95.
75. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1658-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1659. Justice O'Connor reasoned that since there was a significant split
in authority over the common law standard, one simply could not assume that Con-
gress intended one view to govern rather than the other. I1d.
77. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp.
IV 1980). See infra note 96.
19841
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
nificant deterrence, she concluded that the policies against
awarding punitive damages for reckless acts of public offi-
cials outweighed the desirability of any incremental deter-
rent effect that such awards may have.73
IV. ANALYSIS
In determining the impact of this decision on constitu-
tional tort litigation, it is necessary to consider the purposes
that punitive damages have traditionally served. Generally,
punitive damages have been awarded to achieve three dis-
tinct objectives: punishment, deterrence, and law
enforcement.79
While punishment is not a "prominent" purpose under
section 1983, punitive damages as authorized in Smith v.
Wade8" will appropriately serve this objective by imposing
such awards on those whose aggravated conduct has inten-
tionally or recklessly violated another's constitutional
rights.8 ' Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to
suppress the organized violence of the Ku Klux Klan.82 The
Act includes criminal as well as civil sanctions.83 Awarding
punitive damages under section 1983 compliments the objec-
tives of its criminal counterpart. 84 This is particularly im-
portant when the enforcement of criminal sanctions is lax.85
The major objective of both section 1983 and punitive
78. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Electric Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979). See also D. DOBBS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 2 (1981); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES § 2.1 (1980); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REv. 1258, 1277-78 (1976).
80. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
81. One commentator has suggested that the retributive purpose of punitive dam-
ages is justified as a means of deterring self-help while vindicating important rights.
See Comment, supra note 30, at 207.
82. See Gressman, supra note 21, at 1334-36; Note, supra note 18, at 1153-56.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) imposes a criminal sanction on any person who will-
fully violates the civil rights of another under color of state law. See Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (prosecution requires proof of specific intent).
84. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
85. For a discussion of the difficulties of enforcing criminal sanctions against civil
rights violators, see Caldwell & Brodie, Enforcement ofthe Criminal Civil Rights Stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. Section 242, in Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEo. L.J. 706 (1964).
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damages is to deter future egregious conduct.s6 To fully
evaluate the deterrent effect of punitive damages in section
1983 actions, it is instructive to consider some of the criti-
cisms which have been raised against such damages.8 7
One criticism of punitive damages is that its deterrence
justification does not take into account the fact that imposing
compensatory damages is also an effective deterrent.88 How-
ever, in the context of section 1983, this argument carries less
weight. After Carey v. Piphus,89 a perpetrator of outrageous
conduct in violation of procedural due process could escape
monetary liability if the plaintiff were not able to prove com-
pensable injury.90 Thus, punitive damages may provide the
only effective source of deterrence for such violations. Fur-
thermore, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ob-
served that "[t]he availability of punitive damages as a
deterrent may be more significant than ever today, in view of
the apparent trend of decisions curtailing the powers of fed-
eral courts to impose equitable remedies to terminate [con-
stitutional] violations." 91
Another argument against allowing punitive damages is
that the awards will deter public officials from holding pub-
lic office.92 However, this danger is not very significant be-
86. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981).
87. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 79, § 3.9; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
supra note 79, ch. 2; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed.
1971); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
Rv. 1 (1982); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. RPv. 133 (1982); Note, In Defense ofPunitive
Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 303 (1980).
88. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 137-38.
89. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
90. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n.9 (1980). In addition to this requirement
of proof of actual injury, other barriers to recovering damage awards under section
1983 include absolute and qualified immunities, restrictions on vicarious liability, and
requirements of proof of causation. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. Rnv.
5, 42-47 (1980). This commentator concluded that because of the numerous barriers
to section 1983 recovery, damages are not available to fulfill the goals conventionally
said to be served by a tort action--deterrence, affirmation of the plaintiffis right, pun-
ishment and compensation. Id. at 47.
91. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally S.
NAHMOD, supra note 18, ch. 5.
92. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1656-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at
1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cause the public official immunity doctrine93  provides
substantial protection against the imposition of damages for
good faith violations of the Constitution.94 Moreover, once
the protected sphere of a qualified immunity has been ex-
ceeded, punitive damages are more apt to serve as an effec-
tive deterrent against public officials who are capable of
recurrent constitutional violations by reason of their office.9
Concerning the final objective, that of law enforcement,
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197696 al-
ready provides an incentive for constitutional tort plaintiffs
to act as private attorneys general. However, a typical plain-
tiff will often be unwilling to sue for nominal damages and
attorney fees. Therefore, the possibility of recovering puni-
tive damages in aggravated cases would create an additional
incentive to bring suit, thereby fulfilling the law enforcement
function of punitive damages.97
V. CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Wade9" the Supreme Court established puni-
tive damages as an integral component of the relief available
in section 1983 actions. By sanctioning such awards, the
Court advanced one of the specific purposes underlying sec-
tion 1983, that of preventing future violations of constitu-
93. See supra note 66.
94. See Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW.
1 (1981).
95. Punitive damages are likely to have their greatest deterrent effect when they
are levied against "going concerns with an institutional motivation to respond." D.
DOBBS, supra note 79, § 3.9.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980). The statute provides in pertinent part that
in federal civil rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Id.
97. One commentator stated:
Availability of punitive damages may make it worthwhile for plaintiffs to sue
defendants who should be sued but who, in the absence of punitive awards,
would not be, because of the trifling nature of the actual damages suffered by
the plaintiff. The public interest requires these defendants to be admonished.
The prospect of punitive damages encourages the plaintiff to seek the
admonishment.
Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 870, 878 (1976)
(footnote omitted).
98. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
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tional rights. The decision properly reflects the compelling
need to punish and deter aggravated misconduct when inter-
ests as important as constitutional rights are at stake. Fur-
thermore, by adopting a reckless disregard standard, the
Court avoided unduly restricting the availability and effect
of punitive damages in section 1983 actions. Preserving a
strong civil rights cause of action is essential to a continued
dedication to individual liberties.
THOMAS L. HORVATH
